IdeaFest: Interdisciplinary Journal of Creative Works and
Research from Humboldt State University
Volume 3 ideaFest: Interdisciplinary Journal of
Creative Works and Research from Humboldt State
University

Article 11

2019

Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where There is
No-Self
Aaron Alexander Laughlin
Humboldt State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/ideafest
Part of the Buddhist Studies Commons, Hindu Studies Commons, and the Religious Thought,
Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons
Recommended Citation
Laughlin, Aaron Alexander (2019) "Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where There is No-Self," IdeaFest: Interdisciplinary Journal of
Creative Works and Research from Humboldt State University: Vol. 3 , Article 11.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/ideafest/vol3/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons @ Humboldt State University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in IdeaFest: Interdisciplinary Journal of Creative Works and Research from Humboldt State University by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Humboldt State University. For more information, please contact kyle.morgan@humboldt.edu.

Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where There is No-Self
Acknowledgements

Stephen Jenkins

This article is available in IdeaFest: Interdisciplinary Journal of Creative Works and Research from Humboldt State University:
https://digitalcommons.humboldt.edu/ideafest/vol3/iss1/11

57

RELIGIOUS STUDIES

Tathāgatagarbha and Ātman: Self Where
There is No-Self
Aaron Alexander Laughlin1*

K E Y W O R D S — B u d d h i s m , H i n d u i s m , s e l f , p h i l o s o p h y , r e l i g i o n , ātman, tathāgatagarbha, B u d d h a - n a t u r e ,
Buddha-mind, emptiness, no-self

Humans have long grappled with the question of the nature of our Self, defined here as the ultimate reality inherent to our individual being. Religious traditions can be a
great place to look when attempting to understand this
aspect of our humanity. Broadly speaking, when contemplating ideas of Self in Buddhism and Hinduism, the relationship between the Buddhist notion of Buddha-nature
(tathāgatagarbha) and the Hindu notion of Self (ātman), is
an intriguing one: How can we understand them to be
similar or different? How do the Buddhist concepts of
emptiness (śūnyatā) and mind-only (cittamātra) relate to
the concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ātman? Is emptiness
contrary to these ideas? Are tathāgatagarbha and the Hindu teaching that ātman is equal to brahman (ultimate reality), both expressions of a non-dualistic state of mind?
Although it is commonly taught that Hinduism and Buddhism differ in their understanding of Self, one thing that
becomes apparent is that these are not simple questions,
perhaps mainly because their answers are contextual.
There are many answers that come from many different
types of Hindus and Buddhists in various places. For this
paper, I will be looking at commentary on the Buddhist
text the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra and its use of the
concept of a permanent Self and how this relates to emptiness (śūnyatā) and skillful means (upāya). This paper
seeks to support my claim that, through skillful means,
ātman and anātman (no-Self) are both saying something
quite similar—despite the apparent paradoxical nature
of this statement—and will look at Buddha-nature in the
Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra as a way to understand and help
articulate this thought.
I would like to make clear at the onset that I do not wish
to claim an authoritative understanding of these concepts
for Buddhists and Hindus (or anyone for that matter);
these observations come from my own context and are
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not meant to speak for the traditions which I am observing. I am not a Buddhist nor a Hindu but I am intrigued
by these concepts and wish to better understand myself
and the worlds from which they come. This brings me
to a question that has arisen for me during my research:
why is Buddha-nature and ātman important to consider?
I believe that the implications of these ideas have very
tangible consequences in the world and can change how
we think of concepts such as compassion. They can shape
the way we contextualize ourselves in the world.
We must become comfortable with paradox when
considering these ideas. Ultimately, we are using words
as a means to an end (that perhaps is not to be thought
of as an end exactly) that does not necessarily reflect the
means. In other words, describing states of mind and ontology through words in these traditions results in contradiction, because words are limiting boxes that cannot
completely contain or reflect reality. Yet, is it not these
contradictions that bring us into a deeper interaction with
these Buddhist teachings? Externalizing our search for
understanding with words such as “deeper” help to illustrate this tension when looking at Buddha-nature; is there
a “deeper” or “True” permanent Self, or is there no essential substantial Self in existence? Perhaps there is both.
When speaking of the Buddha as seen in the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra, Paul Williams says, “He has taught Self where
there is really no-Self, and no-Self where there is really
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Self. This is not false but skillful means. Here the Buddha-nature is really no-Self, but it is said to be Self in a
manner of speaking” (99).
The difficulty in using language to describe the tension between Self and no-Self can be seen in the Nirvāna
Sūtra (as the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra has been referred to)
when it asserts that the “core nature of each individual
is that of a buddha, but mental afflictions (kléa) prevent
most from realizing it” (Blum, 605). The semantic nature
of using words such as Self and no-Self could be seen to
be “mental afflictions” that prevent us from seeing that
there can be a “core nature” and no core nature at the
same time. Each of these teachings, Buddha-nature or ātman and emptiness or anātman, can steer people towards
different attachments. When one does not see Buddha-nature it could be that attachment to the idea of an ātman
could ultimately deter them from realizing their inherent
Buddha-nature. Yet, this goes both ways; sometimes the
best way to teach could be to teach of Self, in order to lead
one in the most beneficial direction. Scholar Takasaki Jikidö reminds us that teachings are a means to liberation,
“I would emphasize that the follower of the Tathāgatagarbha theory would be content with the evaluation of this
teaching as “conventional,” because any teaching of the
Buddha is, after all, a convention or means for the sake of
deliverance or religious awakening” (82). A conventional
teaching may not reveal the precise ontological distinctions unique to each group of Buddhists that allows a Self
to exist in a worldview that is empty of Self, but it shows
that some Buddhists believe in the benefit to teaching
Self, despite their apparent foundational idea of anātman.
One does not have to look too far into the traditions
of Hinduism to see teachings that reflect the Mahāyana
Buddhist idea of the existence of a core nature and no
core nature at the same time. When the Mahāparinirvāṇa
sūtra speaks of our core Buddha-nature and the Hindu
texts the Upaniṣads speak of ātman, there are parallels between the two. In the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra, there is a story about a king who seeks the sound of a lute. The king
futilely attempts to find the sound in a lute by breaking
it apart until a minister explains to him that this is not
the way to get to the sound. In The Doctrine of the Buddha-Nature in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra by
Ming-Wood Liu, the author explains the themes in this
story as they relate to Buddha-nature, “The central theme
of the story is summed up in the concluding declaration
that the Buddha-nature “abides nowhere,” i.e., is not immanent in some form in sentient beings, just as sound is

not immanent in any part of the lute. In the same manner
as sound is produced when all necessary conditions are
satisfied, the Buddha-nature will reveal itself to sentient
beings when they practice in earnest the way to enlightenment prescribed by the tathagata” (Liu, 82). This story
resonates strongly with one from the Chandogya Upaniṇad. In this story, Śvetaketu is being taught by his father
about the nature of ātman and brahman. The father asks
Śvetaketu to divide a fig, and then a seed from the fig, and
when Śvetaketu says that he sees nothing by dividing the
seed, the father says, as quoted in A Survey of Hinduism,
“‘My dear, that subtle essence which you do not perceive,
that is the source of this mighty Nyagrodha tree. That
which is so tiny is the ātman of all. This is the true, the self,
that you are, Śvetaketu’” (Klostermaier, 169). Both stories
could be seen to speak of a self that does not exist inside
of things, and cannot be found by breaking things down.
Yet, it is the breaking down of the lute and the fig that aid
in the acknowledgement of the ideas of ātman and Buddha-nature because there is something else there that has
yet to reveal itself. The essence that cannot be seen is that
which is doing the seeing; the unseen seer or ātman and
buddha womb or tathāgatagarbha, could be understood
through these stories to be consciousness itself.
Both Hindus and Buddhists have described our core
nature, or Self, as an unadulterated state of consciousness. The Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra describes Buddha-nature
as the pure, inherent element within everyone that is the
potential for one to attain buddhahood, which could be
interpreted as to imply that it is consciousness. Later
sūtras, such as the Śrīmālā sūtra describe tathāgatagarbha
as “intrinsically pure radiant consciousness (pp. 106–7)”
(Williams, 102). Ātman is described in the same way.
According to A Survey of Hinduism, “Ātman is pure consciousness” (Klostermaier, 357). Consciousness is a universal phenomenon through which a myriad of manifestations has expressed themselves throughout time; it is
quite possible, from my perspective, that many of the arguments and distinctions between Buddhist conceptions
of no-Self and Hindu conceptions of Self have been the result of getting caught up in words because semantics can
get sticky; words are messy, impermanent, and hold the
power to nudge towards enlightenment but also confuse
and separate people. Through the eyes of the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra, the Buddha did not care enough about the
doctrine of no-Self to defend it needlessly; when accused
of nihilism by Hindu Brahmins he responded by affirming
his teachings as describing a Self. This portrays a value
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for flexibility over rigidity as well as a sense of skillful
means and a compassionate, enlightened perspective.
It has been argued in Buddhist sūtras, such as the
Śrīmālā sūtra, that it takes an enlightened perspective to
accurately speak of Self in a reality of no-Self. The Śrīmālā
sūtra states that, “it is difficult to understand the meaning
of the intrinsically pure consciousness in a condition of
defilement” (Williams, 102). This seems to be at the crux
of the apparent issue between ātman, anātman, and Buddha-nature; Buddha-nature is not in the descriptions of
it, but in the pervasive sound that coalesces from an understanding free of descriptions. This train of thought—
which is really a kind of no-thought—can be seen to go
back to the Upaniṣads, as quoted in A Survey of Hinduism,
“‘This Self cannot be attained by instruction, nor by much
thought nor by listening to many scripture readings: the
Self is only attained by one who is chosen: to such a one
the ātman reveals itself’” (Klostermaier, 172). Much like in
the story of the king and the lute, Buddha-nature reveals
itself when one is, in a way, chosen or ready to see that
which is waiting to be revealed. Hindus and Buddhists
have both understood the Self in an empty way; the Self
is revealed when one finds their way out of the endless
vortex of descriptions that try to describe itself. The Self
exists within a context of no-Self.
By looking at the story of Yājñavalkya and Gārgī Vacaknavī in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad one can see how
Self can exist within a context of no-Self. Through this story we can see how the idea of ātman and brahman could
be seen to exist in emptiness, which could mean that ātman does not have to be at odds with anātman. At one
point, Gārgī questions Yājñavalkya about what the world
is woven on warp and woof, in other words, what are the
frame and threads that make up the fabric of our reality.
Eventually, after going from water, to wind, to creation
and so on, her questioning arrives at brahman, which she
also questions, asking for its source as well. Yājñavalkya stops Gārgī’s questioning here saying, “‘Gārgī do not
question too much lest your head fall off. You are questioning too much about the divine being, about which
we are not to question too much” (Klostermaier, 167). To
me, this story implies that one could keep questioning
and breaking things down to further realize the extent of
emptiness, but Yājñavalkya recognizes this as unhelpful.
Using skillful means, he stops her questioning at brahman;
this not only affirms that brahman is the level of reality
that Gārgī (at this juncture in her understanding) should
be concerned with, but also affirms the ambiguous nature

of this teaching. The teacher uses skillful means in this
story to end the questioning mind of someone perhaps
not ready to contemplate the extent of emptiness. Much
like the affirmation of mind in Yogācāra Buddhism in
the face of emptiness, ātman affirms a quality much like
Buddha-nature in the face of the knowledge that there
is always more to dissolve under analysis. The question
becomes what is the use, or skillful means of dissolving
everything? What is the need or benefit of going beyond
ātman? If the danger in ātman is attachment to the idea of
a Self, which is ultimately an illusion or egoistic self, how
different is it to be attached to the notion of Buddha-nature or anātman? One answer is as follows, “The theories
of ātman and anātman are both “skilful ways” (upāyah) to
save ordinary men from errors. Neither ātman nor anātman are the truth” (Ishigami-Iagolnitzer, Mitchiko, 5). My
interpretation of this quote tells me that we should appreciate the deep ambiguity of these notions and their ability
to adapt to the needs of the one investigating them.
The Hindu notion of brahman portrays this deep ambiguity, which is characteristic of the conventional teachings we have explored within Buddhism. Since brahman
is understood to be beyond even creation itself, it can
be said that one could conceive of it as a no-thing that is
empty of our conception of it. The name brahman could
be understood as a conventional means of explaining
something beyond words. As quoted in A Survey of Hinduism, the Upaniṣads say, “Where words do not reach and
the mind cannot grasp, there is the brahman full of bliss”
(Klostermaier, 168). Scholars and Mahāyāna Buddhists
have recognized the similarity here to Buddha-nature
thought. “It seems to be a return to the ātman (or Brahman), but this Great Self, for Mahāyāna Buddhists, is only
a conventional name, given to reality void of substance,
which is Vacuity and Nirvāṇa” (Ishigami-Iagolnitzer, Mitchiko, 5). Both traditions are pointing towards a unifying
substance with no substance; a consciousness free of deluded consciousness described by words that are empty
of ultimate meaning or truth, in order to indicate a suchness in nothingness.
I find it important to note at this point in the paper
the fact that religious traditions change, and our perception of them should keep this in mind. Ideas develop as
time passes and outside influences affect the traditions
and ideas within them. Buddhism has responded to itself and attempted to reconcile seemingly contradictory
ideas, such as the emptiness described by Madhyamaka teachings with the mind-only teachings of Yogācāra
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and anātman with Buddha-nature. In the lengthy paper
entitled A Study of Yogācāric Influence on Tathāgatagarbha
Doctrine as Found in Lahkavatarasūtra, by Mei Hsiao, this
change is examined in detail:

according to the context from which it is extracted, aims
to indicate that the teaching of tathāgatagarbha is entirely
different from the theory of ātman held by the heretical
philosophers” (Hsiao, 42). There are many reasons as to
why this may have been the case and among them could
be that there is a lot at stake (socially, philosophically,
politically, and so on) in maintaining the distinction between Buddhism and Hinduism, which can hinge upon
the distinction between anātman and ātman. Part of my
claim, and support for a text such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, is
that this goes against an understanding of skillful means.
As a result of acting within the world, these Buddhists
may be attempting to hold onto their traditions and identities as forms of attachment (for good, valid reasons
maybe), but this, perhaps, leads one away from the ideals of Buddha-nature. My claim here is not some sort of
ultimate truth however, and I am in no way saying I am
righter than Buddhists (and non-Buddhists) who follow
this thought pattern or that this thought is not valid or
correct from some perspectives. The world is incredibly
complex and this is simply an opinion based on my own
relative understanding.
Although there may not be one true way to conceive
of the Self through the lens of Buddhism and Hinduism,
I believe there is great benefit in placing these ideas within a context of compassion. In the dissertation by Kiseong Shin called The Concept of Self and its Implication for
Salvation in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, when
discussing the implication of the ideas of self in Advaita
Vedānta the author states, “Harmony and balance of the
universe is intrinsic because all things are united together
in one true self” (Shin, 184). This is certainly one way we
can take the teachings of ātman and brahman. It is important to note, however, that historically speaking this is not
the only way these teachings have been taken. If ātman
is eternally pure and cannot be defiled then one could
conclude that death, whether inflicted towards oneself
or another may not, in a sense, be significant. That being said, this is not the only necessary conclusion either.
My point here is that the realization of Self in the form
of ātman or Buddha-nature is not inherently compassionate. Many times in Hindu mythology yogis receive great
destructive power from deep realization and as seen in
the recent conflict in Myanmar, Buddhists are certainly
capable of violence as well. Yet, conceiving of Self in the
ways understood through this paper can be an incredibly
compassionate ideal, as Buddhists have shown through
their teachings. Shin sees similarities between Buddhist

“Finally, having thoroughly examined tathagata-nairatmya-garbha in the Lankdvatdrasūtra, it
was found that the doctrines of tathāgatagarbha and pudgala-nairatmya were aligned with
each other but only under a certain condition—that is, only when the ātman proposed
by other religions was denied. However, from
the viewpoint of the metaphysical aspect of
the Lankdvatdrasūtra, the tathāgatagarbha can be
considered to be the genuine Ātman, but one
which is very different from the absolute an-ātman declared in Primitive Buddhism. Actually,
there is a noticeable inconsistency between the
views of Primitive Buddhism and the tathāgatagarbha tradition” (Hsiao, 69).
While my paper is generally in disagreement with the
notion that the tathāgatagarbha tradition is inconsistent
with the anātman of so-called “Primitive Buddhism,” I
find, as discussed throughout this paper, that through
the example of the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra one can see how
these ideas are saying something similar as a form of paradox. It is important to make note of the fact that there are
many ways people have viewed this problem. The focus
of my paper is not to detail the historical setting that influenced the development of these ideas; there are many
social and political factors that have greatly affected the
development of Buddhism and Buddha-nature and they
are all important to consider. But, I believe there is a way
to see a connection between Buddha-nature, ātman, and
anātman, and a text such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra is a great
place to observe this train of thought. Hsiao sees this as
well as a clearly popular trend among later Mahāyāna
Buddhists, and states that “In the ideological trend of later Mahāyāna Buddhism, the doctrine of ‘real and eternal
mind-only’ became all influential and dominant” (Hsiao,
81).
When reading through A Study of Yogācāric Influence
on Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine as Found in Lahkavatarasūtra,
it became clear that there has been much justification of
Buddha-nature thought by Buddhists, some that accept
ātman within their tradition and some that do not. The
philosophy of ātman was considered by some to be heretical, “The compound “tathagata-nairatmya-garbha,”
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and Hindu thought and concludes in one section of the
paper on Buddhism that, “Compassion is essential in the
realization of co-origination of everything because everything is interconnected with everything else. Bowers
argues that everything in the world is co-originated, and
self and other are non-differentiated, then ‘loving the other means loving the self’” (Shin, 187). When considering
this within my own context, I share the same sensibilities
and find the careful exploration of these ideas to be a valid and thorough way of fostering a compassionate state
of mind that can directly influence one’s behavior in the
world.
Throughout the process of writing and researching for
this paper, I have found the theory of Buddha-nature as
Self to be a beautiful idea. Maybe this could be explained
because I have an attachment to the idea of a Self and
this is ultimately a hindrance on my own potential path
to a less deluded realization of reality. Perhaps Self for
me could be a beneficial convention to deepen my own
understanding. I stand open to the possibility of abandoning my own affinity for a pure, permanent form of (or
experience of) consciousness that is the nature of one’s
Self and true reality (that cannot be truly reached through
language). However at this point, for my personal understanding, I prefer to find a similar beauty in the theories
of Buddha-nature and ātman without saying they are or
must be considered identical. I find this beauty to be an
important and valuable thought; one that can help the
world by helping to invigorate a sense of beauty, acceptance, and compassion.
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